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Xiongfeng Ma,1, ∗ Tobias Moroder,1 and Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus1
1Institute for Quantum Computing and Department of Physics and Astronomy,
University of Waterloo, 200 University Ave W., Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 3G1
An efficiency-loophole-free quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme is proposed, which involves
no hardware change but a modification in the data post-processing step. The scheme applies to a
generic class of detection systems which allow correlations between the detection efficiency and the
outcomes. We study the system transmittance and the detection error rate that allow implementing
this scheme. We also consider the case that a quantum memory is used to boost the performance
and investigate the criteria of the readout probability. The simulation result shows that the lowest
tolerable system transmittance (readout probability) is 50%, while the necessary efficiency for an
efficiency-loophole-free Bell’s inequality test is 82.8%.
PACS numbers:
Bell’s inequalities [1] play a critical role in testing
against alternative theories of quantum mechanics, like
the local hidden variable theory. Following the early Bell
test experiments [2, 3], there are many experiments per-
formed in the last decade [4, 5, 6, 7] that have favored
quantum mechanics. However, the locality loophole [8]
and the efficiency loophole (or fair sampling problem) [9]
block these experiments to draw a decisively conclusion.
Note that no Bell test experiment has been done so far
to close all these loopholes simultaneously.
The efficiency loophole exists when the data post-
processing only focuses on a certain part, but not all, of
the prepared states. For instance, in many Bell test ex-
periments (especially for optical implementations), data
used to test the inequality are conditional on coincidence
events, where detections occur in both wings of the exper-
iment. The underlying assumption for this post-selecting
is that the sample of detected states is representative of
all the states prepared. Unfortunately, this fair sampling
assumption can not be tested (proved) from the experi-
ment. This is normally called detection efficiency loop-
hole or fair sampling problem.
Since the concept of entanglement is closely related to
Bell’s inequalities [34] and entanglement is the precondi-
tion of quantum key distribution (QKD) security [10], a
natural question is “Does this efficiency loophole affect
the security of QKD?” The answer is yes.
In theory, the security of QKD has been proven in lit-
erature [11, 12, 13]. When it comes to real-life implemen-
tations, various device imperfections should be taken into
consideration. A lot of efforts have been made to achieve
the security of QKD with realistic devices [14, 15]. Nev-
ertheless, not all the imperfections have been fully ex-
amined yet. Hence, these security analyses cannot be
applied to some realistic cases. For example, the efficien-
cies of two detectors (one detects 0 and the other detects
1) in a QKD system may not be the same, which opens
up a loophole to attacks such as the efficiency mismatch
attack [16] and the time-shift attack [17]. Note that the
time-shift attack has been successfully demonstrated in
lab recently [18]. A simple counter measure on the sin-
gle photon level to these two attacks exists by randomly
switching two detectors [19, 20]. However, this counter
measure does not close the efficiency loophole and fur-
ther attacks can be launched [21]. All in all, the system
transmission efficiency opens a loophole to QKD attacks.
This loophole stems from the aforementioned fair sam-
pling problem in Bell’s inequality test.
In this Letter, we examine a typical detection sys-
tem and explain why the efficiency loophole exists in
QKD. We then propose an efficiency-loophole-free QKD
scheme. The proposed scheme differs from the existing
QKD schemes only in the classical data post-processing
procedure, mainly the privacy amplification part. No
hardware change is required for the new scheme. Finally,
we apply it to various photon sources with and without
quantum memory to show the criteria for QKD devices
to implement this scheme.
There are two types of QKD schemes. In the prepare-
and-measure scheme, Alice, the sender, prepares a state
and sends it to Bob, the receiver. In the entanglement
based scheme, an eavesdropper, Eve, prepares a bipartite
state for Alice and Bob. In the security proof, we assume
that Eve controls the channel. Thus, in either cases, the
state to be detected is prepared by Eve. In general, the
state coming to a detection system can be in an arbitrary-
dimensional Hilbert space. The following discussion will
focus on the prepare-and-measure case, where we only
need to consider the detection system on Bob’s side. For
the entanglement based scheme, Alice’s detection system
is the same as Bob’s.
In the following discussion, we will focus on a generic
case that the detection system is composed of two de-
tectors (for bit 0 and 1). Then, in a real experiment,
there are four possible outputs: neither of the detector
clicks (no click), one detector clicks (0), the other detec-
tor clicks (1) and both detectors click (double click). A
traditional data pre-processing works as follows: discard
all no clicks, keep single clicks and randomly assign 0 or
1 to double clicks.
2In theory, a so-called squashing model is widely used
in security proofs of QKD [14, 15]. Note that security
proofs of QKD with a threshold detector model [35], are
presented [22, 23, 24] recently.
Squashing model: A detection system first per-
forms an operation F mapping the incoming state ρ
(in an arbitrary-dimensional Hilbert space) into a two-
dimensional pace (qubit) state ρ2 with an ancillary state
ρf (in an arbitrary-dimensional space). Then two mea-
surements are performed on ρ2 with outcome 0/1 and on
ρf with outcome of a flag showing no/single/double click.
Note that both measurements ofM andMf may depend
on the basis choice. The schematic diagram is shown in
Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: A schematic diagram for a detection system. The
operator (F ) is the key component of the squashing model,
which projects the incoming state ρ into a qubit state ρ2 and
a flag state ρf . The measurement outcome of the flag state
ρf gives Bob information about no/single/double click.
Typical security proofs of QKD rely on the assumption
that the measurement outcome on ρf is independent of
the squashed qubit ρ2. With this assumption, Alice and
Bob can safely discard all no clicks and focus on other
detections in the post-processing. In reality, this assump-
tion might not be valid. One example is the time-shift
attack [17]. Similar to Bell’s inequality tests, this is where
the efficiency loophole (or fair sampling problem) comes
into the scenario.
One way to close the efficiency loophole in QKD is
by making the overall transmittance to be 100%. This is
not feasible with current technology. From the discussion
above, we already know that the fair sampling problem
exists in QKD because of discarding no clicks in the data
pre-processing. In order to have an efficiency-loophole-
free QKD scheme, we only need to modify the data pre-
processing: keep single clicks and randomly assign 0 or
1 for no clicks and double clicks. Now that the data
from all states are used for the post-processing, the fair
sampling problem is avoided.
With this modified pre-processing, Bob always detects
0 or 1 for each pulse sent by Alice. It is equivalent to
say that the system transmittance is 100%. On the other
hand, Bob has extra information from the measurement
on the flag state ρf . Shortly, we will see that this infor-
mation is useful for key generation. Now, the definitions
of gain and quantum bit error rate (QBER) are different
from the traditional ones, where the data post-processing
only focuses on the single and double clicks. Define Qs
to be the rate for Bob to get a single click. Define Es
to be the error rate given that Bob gets a single click.
Note that both quantities, Qs and Es, can be experi-
mentally measured or tested. The QBER with the new
pre-processing is given by
δ = EsQs + e0(1 −Qs), (1)
where the second term is due to the random bit assign-
ment for the double clicks and no clicks and e0 = 1/2.
There are two types of errors: system errors, with a rate
of Es, and the ones caused by random bit assigning, with
a rate of e0 = 1/2.
Basis independent source: There are two types
of basis independent sources [14]: perfect single photon
source and entangled photon source [25]. For a QKD
system using a basis independent source, the phase error
probability is the same as the bit error probability,
δp = δb = δ, (2)
where the QBER δ is given by Eq. (1). Here we consider
the infinite key length limit. Then the key rate is given
by [14]
R ≥ 1−H2(δ)−H2(δ), (3)
where H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the
binary entropy function.
As mentioned above, in the efficiency-loophole-free
QKD scheme, Bob randomly assigns 0 or 1 for no clicks
and double clicks. One observation is that Bob knows
the location of the random bits. In the squash model we
described in Fig. 1, this location information comes from
the measurement on the flag state ρf . Hence, he can
group the key bits into two strings: the one coming from
single clicks (ss) and the other from random assignments
(sr). Alice and Bob together can experimentally test the
error rate in ss, which is Es. Suppose the phase error
rates in ss and sr are Eps and Epr, respectively, then the
overall phase error probability δp can be expressed by (in
the long key limit), δp = QsEps + (1 − Qs)Epr . Due to
the fact that 0 ≤ Qs ≤ 1 and Epr ≥ 0, we can have the
upper bound of the phase error rate in ss,
Eps ≤
δp
Qs
=
δ
Qs
. (4)
Thus the key rate from the single click part is given by
R ≥ Qs[1−H2(Es)−H2(
δ
Qs
)], (5)
where δ is given by Eq. (1). We know that no positive key
can be extracted from the random bit string. So Eq. (5)
gives a lower bound of the overall key rate. Thus, in the
post-processing, Alice and Bob discard all no clicks and
3double clicks, and perform error correction and privacy
amplification on the bits from single clicks according to
Eq. (5). From here we can see that the new scheme differs
from the traditional one in two aspects.
1. Double clicks are discarded in the new scheme,
while they are randomly assigned to be 0/1 in the
traditional scheme.
2. More privacy amplification is performed in the new
scheme according to Eq. (5).
To illustrate the intuition behind Eq. (5), let us first
consider two attacks with a simple case where Es = 0.
When Es = 0, we can directly conclude from Eq. (5) that
Qs > 0.5 is the lowest tolerable single click rate.
The extreme case of time-shift attack [17]: Eve
can control detectors to be active (100% efficiency) or
inactive (0% efficiency). A simple attack is that Eve ran-
domly chooses one of the two detectors to be active and
the other inactive. In this case, Eve knows all the in-
formation about the key and introduces 50% loss, which
follows Qs ≤ 0.5. No positive key can be obtained from
Eq. (5) in this case.
The strong pulse attack [26]: Eve randomly chooses
a basis to measure the state sent by Alice and replace it
with a strong pulse according to the measurement result.
For example, Eve chooses X basis measurement and ob-
tains an outcome of +. She resends many copies of +
state. In this case, Bob gets either a + outcome (if he
chooses X basis measurement) or a double click (with a
high probability if he chooses Z basis measurement) with
equal probabilities. Again, in this case, we get Qs ≤ 0.5,
which leads no positive key from Eq. (5).
Since the lowest tolerable transmittance (roughly Qs)
is around 50% and we know that the dark count rate is
low, typically below 10−4, in the following simulations,
we neglect the dark counts.
Now, let us study a simple case that Alice uses a single
photon source. From Eq. (1), the single click rate and its
error rate are given by
Qs = η,
Es = ed,
δ = edη + e0(1− η),
(6)
where η is the overall transmittance, taking into account
the channel loss and the detection efficiency, and ed is
the intrinsic detection error probability. Now we can see
that there are two crucial QKD system parameters, ed
and η, determining the key rate given by Eq. (5). The
lower bound for the tolerable ed and η is shown in Fig. 2.
A parametric down-conversion (PDC) source is widely
used as an entangled photon source, which is another
type of basis independent source. Following the model
presented in Ref. [25], one can calculate the single click
rate, its error probability and then the key rate by
Eq. (5). We have numerically checked all possible choice
of the source intensities µ, but no positive key rate R by
Eq. (5) can be achieved.
Coherent state source: Now, let us consider another
case that a weak coherent state photon source is used.
Here we apply the GLLP security analysis [15] to the
decoy state QKD scheme [27, 28]. Similar to the deriva-
tion of Eq. (5), the key rate of the efficiency-loophole-free
QKD scheme with a coherent state source is given by
R ≥ −QsH2(Es) + P1Y1[1−H2(
δ1
Y1
)], (7)
where Y1 is the probability that Bob gets a single click
given Alice sends out a single photon state, P1 = µe
−µ
is the probability Alice sends out a single photon state,
and δ1 is the error rate of the single photon states in-
cluding random bit assignment. The single photon state
yield Y1 and its error rate e1 can be estimated by decoy
states. Assume that the overall transmittance is η, then
the parameters Y1 and δ1 are given by
Y1 = η,
δ1 = edY1 + e0(1− Y1),
(8)
Here in the simulation, we neglect dark counts and double
clicks, so that Qs = Qµ = 1 − e
−ηµ and Es = Eµ =
ed. We can see that when µ approaches to 0, Eq. (7)
will converge to Eq. (5) except for an overall ratio. To
illustrate the criteria for case of decoy state QKD with
coherent state source, we pick up a typical value of µ used
in real experiments, µ = 0.5, for the simulation. Now,
we can find the relation between the tolerable ed and η,
as shown in Fig. 2.
From Fig. 2, we know that the transmittance, η, is re-
quired to be higher than 50% for a QKD system even
when a perfect single photon source is used. With the
current (optical) technology, it is not feasible yet. One
way to solve this problem would be to perform a quan-
tum non-demolition (QND) measurement, distinguishing
vacuum and non-vacuum states, right before Bob’s box.
This QND measurement gives Bob a trigger when the in-
coming signal is a vacuum or not. Since Bob chooses the
basis (randomly) after the QND measurement, the secu-
rity only relies on the state conditional on the trigger.
Note that this QND measurement can also help close the
efficiency loophole in the Bell’s inequality test.
One candidate for this QND measurement is using
a quantum memory. The requirements for a quantum
memory to be used in the efficiency-loophole-free QKD
scheme are listed as follows.
1. The quantum memory can tell whether a photon is
stored or not. When a photon is stored, a trigger
will be emitted.
2. Given that the quantum memory emits a trigger,
the readout probability is ηM , which takes into ac-
count the detection efficiency and the mis-trigger
4probability. The quantum memory is not required
to re-emits photons for readout. A measurement
can be performed on the quantum memory directly.
3. The user can choose measurement basis after the
quantum memory sends out a trigger. Then the
security only relies on the quantum state stored
in the quantum memory. Thus, only the readout
efficiency (normally less than 100%) will cause the
random sampling problem.
We remark that the quantum relay [29] can be used
for the QND measurement as well.
In the case that a basis-independent source (e.g., an
entangled PDC source) is used, we can use Eq. (6) in
Eq. (5). In this case, η is replaced by the readout prob-
ability of the quantum memory, ηM . The tolerable ηM
and ed will be the same as the “Perfect single photon
source” curve shown in Fig. 2.
For the case that a weak coherent state photon source
is used, we have
P1 =
ηcµe
−µ
1− e−ηcµ
,
Qs = Y1 = ηM ,
Es = ed,
δ1 = edηM + e0(1− ηM ),
(9)
where ηc is the channel transmittance, or the probabil-
ity of the quantum memory to send out a trigger signal
given that Alice sends out a photon. One can use Eq. (9)
in Eq. (7) to get the final secure key rate. Here the def-
initions of parameters, δ1, P1 and Y1, are different from
the case without a quantum memory. In this case, these
probabilities are conditional on the trigger sent by the
quantum memory. Since they have close physical mean-
ings, we will use the same set of notations for simplicity.
In a real experiment, R, δ1, P1 and Y1 can be estimated
by decoy states. In the simulation, we use ηc = 1%, cor-
responding to a 100 km fiber link loss, and µ = 0.5. The
result is shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, there is no positive key in the regime E >
11.0% for the single photon source case, which is consis-
tent with the result in the literature [13]. Note that the
y-axes are different for the Coherent+decoy+no memory
and Coherent+decoy+memory curves.
Conclusion remarks:
1. One can also search for better post-processing
schemes, such as those based on two-way classical
communications in the post-processing [30, 31]. An
interesting question is whether the transmittance
η > 50% is a hard limit for efficiency-loophole-free
QKD schemes.
2. Proving the equivalence between the squash model
presented in Fig. 1 and the threshold detector
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FIG. 2: Plot of the lower bound of the tolerable ed and η
(ηM ) for the efficiency-loophole-free QKD scheme. For the
two cases with coherent states, we pick up µ = 0.5 for the
simulation. For the case of Coherent+decoy+memory, we as-
sume the channel transmission is ηc = 1%.
model, like Ref. [24], is an interesting prospective
topic.
3. The idea of discarding random assignment bits and
doing more privacy amplification can be applied to
the normal QKD scheme where random bits are
assigned for double clicks.
4. Although the scheme is proposed for QKD usage,
the post-processing idea may also be useful for
efficiency-loophole-free Bell’s inequality test, where
the necessary efficiency is 82.8% [32]. This effi-
ciency criterion for Bell’s inequality test has been
improved by choosing the optimal set of measure-
ments [33]. In future, it is interesting to investigate
whether this technique is useful for the proposed
QKD scheme.
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